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Abstract
The literature has identiﬁed cross-border pollution, capital mobility and two-stage
clean-up as the key features in the “trade Vs environment” debate, yet no study examines
all three simultaneously. We build a two country trading block model with cross-border
pollution and free movements of goods and capital between the two countries. Pollution
reduces welfare and there is simultaneous private and public pollution abatement. Public
pollution abatement is ﬁnanced with the use of lump-sum and pollution tax revenue.
We derive the Nash and cooperative lump-sum and pollution taxes. We, also, examine
how cross-border pollution and capital mobility aﬀect each country’s optimal tax poli-
cies. Finally, we examine how the existence of capital mobility alters the eﬀectiveness of
pollution taxes on net pollution.
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One of the emerging modern challenges to the free-trade doctrine, raised by environmen-
talists and ecologically conscious groups, is the relation between freer international trade
in goods and factors of production, and the quality of the environment. Seeking the
roots of this “trade vs environment” debate one may invoke several points of concern.
For example, one argument maintains that given the trade induced specialization many
countries’ comparative advantage lies in the production of so-called pollution-intensive
goods. Thus, excessive production of such goods raises the levels of pollution emissions
in these countries. It is also argued that given that pollution emissions are not con-
ﬁned by national geographic boundaries, excessive pollution generated in one country is
likely to have important adverse environmental implications for neighboring countries,
or for the international community at large, via cross-border spillovers. On the other
hand, diﬀerent countries have diﬀerent preferences with respect to environmental quality.
Advanced-developed economies, by and large, are not only concerned with the quantity
of goods and services consumed, but also with the quality of living standards of their
residents. Therefore, they adopt stringent environmental or trade related policy mea-
sures (e.g., pollution taxes and/or quotas, tariﬀs or import quotas) to preserve the quality
of the environment. At the other end of the spectrum, it is argued that, by and large
less-developed countries are becoming so-called “pollution havens” by adopting lax envi-
ronmental regulations in their eﬀort to attract foreign capital. As a result, a number of
international conferences has been staged (e.g., the UN conferences in Rio de Janeiro in
1992 and in Kyoto in 1997, the OECD conference of foreign direct investment (FDI) and
the environment in the Hague in 1999) in order to address these issues.1
In light of the above issues, we brieﬂy review the existing theoretical literature relevant
to the present work. First, there is a strand examining the welfare and policy implications
of cross-border pollution e.g., Markusen (1975a), Copeland and Taylor (1995), Copeland
(1996), Ludema and Wooton (1997), Ludema and Wooton (1994), Beghin, Roland-Holst,
and der Mensbrugghe (1997), Silva (1997), Silva and Caplan (1997), Turunen-Red and
Woodland (1998).
A common analytical assumption in the above studies is that pollution, a by-product
1Jaﬀe, Peterson, Portney, and Stanvis (1995), Grossman and Krueger (1993), Tobey (1990) and
Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) argue that the empirical evidence does not support the “pollution
haven” hypothesis.of production, is entirely abated by the private sector in response to emission taxes on
private producers.2 More often than not, however, pollution emissions are abated partly
by the private and partly by the public sector of a country.3 Ample empirical evidence
shows that the share of public abatement expenditure in total abatement expenditure
is sizeable and it varies among countries and from one type of pollution to another.4
Thus, it is important that both types of abatements are taken into consideration in
analyzing environmental policies. Moreover, the existence of public abatement brings
in an additional instrument at the disposal of the policy maker for combating pollution
o nt o po ft h es t a n d a r di n s t r u m e n t ss u c ha sa ne m i s s i o nt a x ,i nt h ef o r mo ff u n d sm a d e
available for public abatement activities. The existence of multiple instruments in turn
raises the question as to how exactly the aforesaid funds are raised by the policy maker.5
Considerable evidence suggests that emission taxes are often earmarked for pollution
activities by governments.6 As a result, a second and relatively recent strand of this
literature allows for the coexistence of private and public sector pollution abatement,
where the latter activity is ﬁnanced through emission tax revenue earmarked for public
sector pollution abatement activities. For example, Hatzipanayotou, Lahiri, and Michael
(2000) in a North-South model of cross-border pollution examine how the North can
inﬂuence pollution emission policies in the South, the sole generator of pollution, by
the strategic use of international transfers. Khan (1996) analyzes a model with public
pollution abatement only and Chao and Yu (1999) develop a model in which public
pollution abatement coexists with private pollution abatement.7
2Markusen, Morey, and Olewiler (1993) report a number of examples of pollution taxes. Those
include a 1988 tax on fuels in the Netherlands, a 1990 French air pollution tax and a 1990 US tax on the
ozone-depleting factor of a variety of chloroﬂuorocarbons.
3This joint clean-up activity by the two sectors is what we refer to as the “two-stage clean-up”.
4According to OECD statistics, as far as abatement of water pollution in the early 1990s is concerned,
the share of public expenditure in the total expenditure is 66% in the USA and the Netherlands and
only 12% in the UK. As for abatement of air pollution, the share of public abatement in the Netherlands
and the UK is 55% and 30% respectively, but it is only 6% in the case of the USA.
5The number of policy instruments determines whether the ﬁrst-best policy is achievable. Markusen
(1975b) reports that in the absence of a second instrument pollution taxes can be higher or lower than
the ﬁrst-best taxes.
6For example, Brett and Keen (2000) note that, in the US, it is quite customary for environment taxes
to be earmarked for speciﬁc environment related public expenditure. In particular, such tax proceeds
are commonly paid into trust funds that ﬁnance various clean-up activities, or are spend on road and
public transport networks.
7The relationship, in terms of model formulation and analysis, between the present paper and that
of Chao and Yu (1999) ends with this feature of co-existence of pollution abatement by the two sectors.
2Another strand of the relevant literature combines environmental issues and the inter-
national mobility of factors, particularly that of capital. It is argued that capital is prone
to inter-country or regional movements due to diﬀerences in environmental policies and
regulations.8 It is, also, feared that due to environmental capital ﬂight, pollution-intensive
production is concentrated to certain countries/regions, so-called “pollution havens”, with
lax environmental controls. Another concern is that in an eﬀort to attract foreign cap-
ital these countries/regions may race to the bottom in their environmental regulation.9
These and related considerations have lead to a theoretical literature on environmentally
induced capital ﬂight, of which we note the following contributions. Merriﬁeld (1988) in
a two-country general equilibrium model with international ﬂows of goods, capital and
pollution examines appropriate abatement strategies for reducing cross-border pollution.
It is shown, among other things, that an attempt to reduce pollution by means of higher
pollution taxes may raise pollution. Copeland (1994) examines environmental and trade
policy reforms in the context of a polluted small open economy without cross-border
pollution. It is shown, among other things, that when (some) factors are internationally
mobile the welfare gains of a small equiproportionate reform of pollution taxes are at
least as large as when factor mobility is restricted. Copeland and Taylor (1997) construct
a two-good (a labor-using “clean” good and a capital-using “dirty” good) North-South
model (North is richer and relatively capital-abundant) with local pollution. Within
this framework they demonstrate that (i) free trade and no international capital mobil-
ity raise (reduce) world pollution relative to autarky when the North exports the clean
(dirty) good, and (ii) allowing also for free international capital mobility world pollution
rises (falls) when the North initially exports the dirty (clean) good.10
The present paper attempts a synthesis and generalization of the three aforementioned
strands of the literature on the interactions between cross-border pollution, two-stage
clean-up and capital mobility. To this end, we construct a general equilibrium model
8For example, Gray (1997) using US data ﬁnds signiﬁcant negative correlation between new plants
location and inter-state diﬀerences in environmental regulation.
9Rauscher (1991) notes that, in the absence of cross-border pollution, such competition among coun-
tries/regions may not pose a problem from an economic theory point of view, as long as it reﬂects the
countries/regions preferences. But, with cross-border pollution, matters may actually be diﬀerent, since
a country with tight environmental controls suﬀers the consequences of such policies (e.g., lower capital
endowment) but may not enjoy their beneﬁts (i.e., cleaner environment).
10In a diﬀerent context Rauscher (1997), Chao and Yu (1998) and Chao and Yu (2000) raise other
issues regarding the interaction between international capital mobility and locally abated pollution.
3of, what we call a trading block, comprising two countries with free commodity, and
capital ﬂows between them. We assume that pollution, a by-product of production,
generated in each country is transmitted across borders, and it is abated partly by the
private producers, in response to an emissions tax, and partly by the local government
through an imported, from the rest of the world, good used by the public sector for its
pollution abatement activities. Governments ﬁnance the imports of this good through
lump-sum and pollution tax revenue earmarked by the public sector for its pollution
abatement activity. Within this context, we examine the eﬀects of raising lump-sum
or pollution taxes on the levels of pollution and welfare. We also derive the optimal
lump-sum and pollution taxes when the two countries act cooperatively in maximizing
their joint welfare, and when they act non-cooperatively (Nash) maximizing own national
welfare. The analysis also emphasizes the role of intra-block capital mobility for the size
of the optimal cooperative/non-cooperative taxes, and on the eﬀectiveness of pollution
taxes on net pollution in each country.11
2 The Analytical Framework
2.1 The Model
We develop a general equilibrium model of two small open economies, home and foreign,
w h i c ht r a d ef r e e l yw i t he a c ho t h e ra n dt h er e s to ft h ew o r l d . 12 As a result, commodity
prices in the two countries are constant and equal to the world commodity prices. In both
countries pollution of the eyesore type is generated as a by-product of production, and it
is transmitted across national borders. Identical residents, inhabiting each country, are
adversely aﬀected and suﬀer disutility from locally generated pollution and from pollution
emitted by foreign producers and transmitted across borders.
We conjecture that the model may resemble the case of a trading block between two
countries —either both developed (e.g., EU countries) or one developed and one developing
11Rauscher (1991) using a similar model with two countries, one good, cross-border pollution but
without public pollution abatement examines the eﬀects of increased capital mobility on the optimal
levels of quantitative environmental restrictions (i.e., pollution quotas) regulated by the governments.
It is shown that when the two countries act non-cooperatively, increased capital exports, facilitated by
lower costs of cross-border capital mobility, move capital to the country with less restrictive environmental
regulations. Global pollution, however, may be higher or lower relative to the initial situation.
12Following standard convention we denote with an asterisk all the variables of the foreign country.
4(e.g., NAFTA agreement)— vis-à-vis the rest of the world. In such a context, there is free
commodity trade among the block’s member countries, and nearly free commodity trade
between the trading block and the rest of the world. With respect to the ﬂows of factors
of production, capital is by and large freely mobile within the borders of the trading
block, but it may not be as freely mobile between the trading block and the rest of the
world. Finally, mobility of other factors of production, such as labor, may be restricted
both among the member countries, and between the trading block and the rest of the
world.13 Here for analytical simplicity and tractability of the results, it is assumed that
all factors other than capital are intra-block and internationally immobile.
We proceed to develop the model of the home, capital-importing, country; the model
of the foreign, capital-exporting, country follows analogously. The home country’s max-
imum value of production of private goods is denoted by the restricted Gross Domestic





x − tz :( x,z,K) ∈ Φ(v,K)}, (1)
where p is the vector of exogenously given world commodity prices, Φ(v,K) is the coun-
try’s aggregate technology set, v i st h ee n d o w m e n tv e c t o ro ft h ei m m o b i l ef a c t o r s ,K is
the domestic supply of capital, x is the vector of net outputs, and z i st h ea m o u n to f
pollution emission by the private sector, net of the amount abated by the private sector.14
In the present analysis, since (v) and (p) are invariant, for notational simpliﬁcation the
GDP function is written as R(t,K). We assume that the R(t,K) function is strictly con-
cave in K (RKK < 0) and strictly convex in t (Rtt > 0). The latter assumption implies
that a higher emission tax level lowers the amount of pollution emissions by the private
sector. By the envelop theorem, the partial derivative of the GDP function with respect
to K, i.e., RK is the marginal revenue product of capital. Also by the envelop theorem,
the level of pollution, z, generated by the private sector is given by15
z = −Rt(t,K). (2)
For the rest of the analysis we assume that pollution is capital intensive in both countries,
13Restrictions in the intra-block mobility of other factors such as labor are mostly due to cultural,
social and other non-economic reasons.
14For simplicity we assume only one type of pollution emission generated in one or more sectors. A
prime (0) denotes a transposed vector or matrix, and p
0
x − tz is the value of factor income. Finally,
Φ(v,K) includes production technologies and abatement technologies in various private sectors, as they
carry out some pollution abatement in response to the emission tax (t).
15Copeland (1994) and Turunen-Red and Woodland (1998) among others deﬁne pollution in the same
way.
5that is, RtK < 0 and R∗
t∗K∗ < 0.
Accounting for both private and public sector pollution abatement, the overall net
pollution r,a ﬀecting the home country residents is:
r = z − g + Θ(z
∗ − g
∗) (3)
where the parameter Θ ∈ [0,1] is the rate of cross-border pollution or the spillover
parameter, g is the level of public pollution abatement in the home country, and z∗ and
g∗ denote the levels of pollution net of private abatement and the level of public pollution
abatement, respectively, in the foreign country.16
As for the country’s public sector, we assume that it imports from the rest of the world,
at a constant price Pg, a commodity used to provide public pollution abatement at the
level g. The cost of the imported good (i.e.,Pgg), used for public pollution abatement,
is ﬁnanced through the emission tax revenue (i.e.,tRt(t,K)), earmarked for government
pollution abatement activities, and through lump-sum taxes (T). Thus, the government’s
budget constraint is written as:
Pgg = −tRt(t,K)+T. (4)
Turning to the demand side of the economy, we assume that each country is comprised
of identical individuals. Utility is adversely aﬀected by both local and foreign pollution
transmitted across borders. Let E(u,r) denote the minimum expenditure required to
achieve a level of utility, u, at constant prices p, omitted from the expenditure function
for reasons noted earlier, and at the given level of net pollution r. The partial derivative
of the expenditure function with respect to u, Eu, denotes the reciprocal of the marginal
utility of income. Since pollution adversely aﬀects household utility, the partial derivative
of the expenditure function with respect to r, Er, is positive denoting the households’
marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in pollution (e.g. see Chao and Yu (1999)).17
That is, a higher level of net pollution requires a higher level of spending on private goods
to mitigate its detrimental eﬀects so that a constant level of utility is maintained. The
16This formulation of additive level of net pollution, r, implies that the two countries emit the same
pollutant. Generalizing the present speciﬁcation to one where the two countries emit diﬀerent types of
pollutants only results to unwarranted algebraic complications without providing substantive analytical
insight.
17In Copeland (1994)’s terminology, Er is a measure of the marginal damage to consumers from
pollution.
6expenditure function is assumed strictly convex in r, i.e. Err > 0.T h a t i s , a h i g h e r
level of net pollution raises the households’ marginal willingness to pay for its reduction.
It is also assumed that Eru > 0, i.e. a higher level of utility increases the households’
marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement.18
The home, capital-importing, country’s budget constraint requires that private spend-
ing E(u,r) must equal factor income from the production of the private traded goods
R(t,K) minus repatriated earnings of foreign capital domestically employed kfRK(t,K)
and lump-sum taxes T. Thus, the income-expenditure identity for the home country is
E(u,r)=R(t,K) − k
fRK(t,K) − T, (5)
where kf is the amount of foreign capital operating in the home country.
The model for the foreign country is similarly developed. The corresponding equations































where r∗ is the level of total net pollution for the foreign country, Θ∗ i st h er a t eo f
cross-border pollution in that country; K∗ is the supply of capital, and by the assumptions
of the model dK = dkf = −dK∗.
Finally, international capital mobility though non-existent between the trading block
and the rest of the world, is perfect within the trading block, i.e., between the home
and foreign countries. Since it is assumed that capital earnings are untaxed by both
countries, perfect intra-block capital mobility equalizes the factor’s reward in the two






18This implicitly assumes that pollution abatement is a normal good.
7The system of equations (2)-(10) contains nine unknowns, namely u, u∗, g, g∗, z, z∗,
r, r∗ and K; four —two for each country- policy parameters, namely (t,T) and (t∗,T∗);
and four -two for each country- exogenous parameters, namely (Pg,Θ) and (P∗
g∗,Θ∗).F o r
analytical convenience the above system is reduced to equations (4), (5), (8), (9) and (10),
after appropriately substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (5), and equations
(6) and (7) into equation (9). In doing so the initial system is then solved in terms of ﬁve
unknowns, namely u,u∗,g,g∗, and K. The Appendix of the paper lays out the complete
comparative statics of this reduced form system.
2.2 Some Preliminary Results
For the analysis to follow, it is useful to derive the eﬀects of taxes on the capital stock
and public sector pollution abatement activities. We proceed by examining the eﬀects of
a higher domestic pollution tax (t) on these variables, while the eﬀects of a higher foreign
pollution tax (t∗) can be similarly derived.
From the Appendix it is easily derived that, under the conditions of the model, a higher
pollution tax causes a capital outﬂow from the home country (i.e.,(dK/dt)=
−RtK
H < 0),
and thus a capital inﬂow to the foreign country. The eﬀect of the higher (t) on domestic











where H = R∗
K∗K∗ + RKK and ∆ = HPgP∗
g∗.N o t e t h a t H,a n d∆ are negative.
Equation (11) indicates that the eﬀect of a higher (t) on (g) is through its eﬀect on
home country government revenue. In particular, the higher (t) entails a direct positive
eﬀect on government revenue (i.e., −∆−1HP∗
g∗Rt), which enhances the public sector’s
ability to provide (g), and an indirect negative eﬀect (i.e., −∆−1P∗
g∗t(HRtt−R2
tK))w h i c h
mitigates its ability for the provision of (g).19 Intuitively the direct positive eﬀect indicates
that at a given level of pollution (−Rt) ah i g h e r(t) raises government revenue, and thus
the level of (g) provided by the public sector. On the other hand, the higher (t) reduces
government pollution tax revenue in two ways. First, it causes a reduction in RK which
in turn causes a capital outﬂow and the reduction in pollution. As a result, government
19Alternatively, equation (11) can be written as (dg/dt)=( ∂g/∂t) − t
PgRtK(dK/dt),w h e r e ,b yt o t a l
diﬀerentiation of equation (4) it can be easily shown that (∂g/∂t)=−(Rt + tRtt).
8pollution tax revenue falls (i.e., ∆−1P∗
g∗tR2
tK < 0). In addition, pollution falls as a result
of the higher (t) thus exacerbating the reduction in government pollution tax revenue
(i.e.,−∆−1P∗
g∗tHRtt < 0). For a small (t) an increase in its level unambiguously raises
government pollution tax revenue and, thus the provision of (g), through the induced
direct positive eﬀect.









Equation (12) indicates that a higher pollution tax level by the home country raises
public sector pollution abatement in the foreign country. Intuitively, a higher (t) lowers
RK, induces an inﬂow of capital in the foreign country, which in turn raises the level
of foreign pollution. That results in higher pollution tax revenue in the foreign country,
thus enhancing the public sector’s ability to provide public pollution abatement.
3 Taxes, Pollution and Welfare
In this section we examine the eﬀect of a higher domestic pollution tax (t) on net pollution
in the two countries, (r) and (r∗), respectively, and on their respective levels of national
welfare (u) and (u∗). Analogous results are stated for the eﬀects of a higher tax (t∗) on
the aforementioned variables. We also examine the eﬀects of higher lump-sum taxes, T
and T∗ for each country respectively, on the corresponding level of national welfare.
3.1 Pollution Taxes and Net Pollution
The eﬀect of a higher pollution (t) on domestic net pollution (r) can be derived as follows.































9Intuitively, equation (13) shows that a higher tax (t) aﬀects domestic net pollution (r),
ﬁrst through its impact on public abatement in the home and foreign countries. Second,
it aﬀects (r) through changes in domestic and foreign levels of pollution. In particular,
changes in domestic pollution (z) are due to changes in the domestic pollution tax (direct
eﬀect) and changes in the domestic capital stock (indirect eﬀect). Both eﬀects lead to a
reduction of (z). On the other hand, the higher (t) aﬀects foreign pollution (z∗) indirectly
through changes in the foreign country’s capital stock (K∗).T h i s e ﬀect increases (z∗)
and through cross-border pollution it increases (r).




































Observing the reduced forms of equations (13) and (14) we state suﬃcient conditions
under which an increase in (t) reduces net pollution (r) i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r ya n d(r∗) in
the foreign country, in the following Proposition.
Proposition 1 Consider a two-country trading block where there is perfect intra-block
capital mobility and cross-border pollution, and where pollution tax revenue in each coun-
try is earmarked for the provision of a public pollution abatement. Then, a suﬃcient
condition for an increase in (t) to reduce (r) and (r∗) is that (Pg >t ) in the home
country and (P∗
g∗ <t ∗) in the foreign country.
It is worth noting that in the absence of cross-border pollution, i.e.,Θ = Θ∗ =0 , then:
1. (dr/dt) < 0 if only (Pg >t ) and (dr∗/dt) < 0 if only (P∗
g∗ <t ∗),a n d
2. changes in one country’s pollution tax aﬀects the other country’s net pollution
through the induced intra-block capital mobility.
Analogous results are inferred for an increase in the foreign country’s pollution tax
(t∗) on the home and foreign countries’ levels of net pollution.
103.2 Lump-sum Taxes, Pollution Taxes and Welfare
We start our welfare analysis of lump-sum and pollution taxes by deriving some bench-
mark results useful for the analysis to follow. Diﬀerentiating equation (5) gives
du = Erdg + ΘErdg








∗ − dT, (15)
where for simplicity we set Eu =1 . Equation (15) shows that, in the present context,
a higher level of public pollution abatement at home or abroad increases welfare. The
inﬂow of capital in the home country aﬀects domestic welfare in two ways. First, it
aﬀects welfare positively through lower payments to foreign capital operating at home
(ie.,−kfRKK > 0), and second, it aﬀects welfare through induced changes in the levels
of pollution at home and abroad (i.e.,Er(RtK − ΘR∗
t∗K∗). In the absence of cross-border
pollution (i.e., Θ =0 )t h ei n ﬂow of capital has a negative impact on welfare through this
term, but still an ambiguous one overall. On the other hand, if Θ > 0,t h e ni n t r a - b l o c k
capital mobility, which reduces K∗ and lowers cross-border pollution, exerts a positive
impact on welfare through the term −ErΘR∗
t∗K∗.
A higher local environmental tax (t) exerts a positive impact on domestic welfare
through a lower level of domestic pollution (i.e.,ErRtt > 0),a n dt h r o u g hal o w e rr a t eo fr e -
turn on capital, and thus payments to foreign capital operating domestically (i.e.,−kfRKt >
0). But, a higher level of (t) also exerts a negative impact on welfare since it entails the
allocation of more resources to private abatement, thus the reduction of private incomes
and welfare (i.e.,Rt < 0). Finally, a higher level of the foreign environmental tax (t∗),i n
the presence of cross-border pollution, or a lower level of domestic lump-sum taxes (T),
ceteris paribus, unambiguously raise home welfare. Analogous results can be derived for
the foreign country by totally diﬀerentiating equation (9).
Now we turn our attention to the eﬀects of lump-sum taxes and pollution taxes on
national welfare in the two countries. In particular, using the Appendix, the eﬀect of an













where Sg ≡ (Er−Pg) and S∗
g∗ ≡ (E∗
r∗ −P∗
g∗). We say that the public pollution abatement
is locally under(over)-provided in the home country if Sg > 0(< 0), a n di nt h ef o r e i g n
country if S∗
g∗ > 0(< 0). Public pollution abatement is locally optimally provided in the
home (foreign) country if Sg =0 ( S∗
g∗ =0 ˙ ).T h a t i s , i f Er = Pg (E∗
r∗ = P∗
g∗). There-
fore, raising lump-sum taxes, in the present context, is unambiguously welfare improving
(deteriorating) if the public pollution abatement is locally under (over)-provided.
Using the Appendix and equations (15) and (13), the welfare eﬀect of an increase in
home country’s pollution tax (t) on its own welfare is given by
du
dt






























Equation (18) shows that the increase in (t) aﬀe c t st h eh o m ec o u n t r y ’ sl e v e lo fw e l f a r e
i nt h r e ew a y s . T h eh i g h e r(t) induces, ﬁrst, a transfer of additional resources from
production of goods to pollution abatement by private producers. As a result real income,
and therefore, welfare is reduced (i.e., Rt < 0). Second, it aﬀects (u) through changes
in domestic net pollution (i.e., −Er
dr
dt). Namely, since Er is the households’ marginal
willingness to pay for pollution abatement, then −Er
dr
dt is a measure of the marginal
beneﬁt/damage of changes in (r) due to the increase in (t) on households’ utility. Through
this term, the increase in (t) increases (u) if dr
dt < 0 (see suﬃcient conditions of this result
in the discussion of equation (13)). Third, the term −kf(RKt + RKK
dK
dt ) captures the
eﬀect of (t) on (u) through changes in payments to foreign capital operating at home. This
change in payments to kf is due to changes in the domestic marginal revenue product of
capital, RK, induced by the higher (t). Namely, by assumption, a higher (t) reduces RK
and thus payments to kf. In addition, as previously discussed, dK
dt < 0 causing an increase
in the marginal revenue product of capital and thus an increase in payments to kf.I tc a n
be shown, however, that the positive direct eﬀect (−kfRKt) always dominates the negative
indirect eﬀect (−kfRKK
dK
dt ). Thus, the overall impact of (t) on (u) through changes in
payments to kf is positive, as shown by the last term, (i.e., −∆−1kfRtKR∗
K∗K∗PgP∗
g∗), of
12the reduced form of equation (18).











































Equation (19) shows that an increase in (t) aﬀects (u∗), through, ﬁrst, its eﬀect on
net pollution, (r∗), and second through its eﬀect on repatriated payments of its capital
operating in the home country. The discussion of the ﬁrst eﬀect follows the discussion of
equation (14), and the discussion of the second one follows that of equation (18).
Analogously, using the Appendix, the reduced form expressions of an increase in (t∗)























































The discussion of equations (20) and of (21) is analogous to that of equations (18) and
of (19).
4 Optimal Lump-sum and Pollution Taxes
In this section we derive and discuss the properties of the optimal pollution taxes, (t)
and (t∗) ,a n dl u m p - s u mt a x e s ,T and T∗, in the two countries, under three alternative
cases depending on whether or not there exists tax policy cooperation between the two
countries.
134.1 Cooperative Taxes and Welfare
A standard result in the literature of environmental economics is that in the presence of
cross-border pollution externalities optimal policy requires either the adoption of coop-
erative policies among regions/jurisdictions or the mandate of policies by a central (e.g.,
federal) authority.20 Here, we begin our analysis of tax policy choices by presenting the
ﬁrst-best policy choices of the trading-block. This regime entails the simultaneous coop-
erative choice of lump-sum and pollution taxes that maximize the two countries’ joint
welfare. This regime constitutes a benchmark solution to which the equilibrium results
to follow are compared. Even though for purposes of our analysis this case is used only
as a benchmark one, in a trading block with deep economic integration (e.g., the E.U.),
this may be a plausible equilibrium.
4.1.1 Cooperative Lump-sum Taxes and Welfare





dT∗ =0 ,w h e r edu
dT, du∗
dT∗ are given by equations (16) and (17), respectively. Moreover,
using the Appendix we get
∆
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From equations (16), (17), (22) and (23) we get that the cooperative ﬁrst-best policy
choice for provision of public abatement requires that











Intuitively, a unit of pollution generated at home causes Er damage in the home country
and Θ∗E∗
r∗ damage in the foreign country. Thus ¯ Er ≡ (Er + Θ∗E∗
r∗) is the global (total)
damage caused by a unit of locally generated pollution. Similarly ¯ E∗
r∗ ≡ (E∗
r∗+ΘEr) is the
global damage caused by a unit of foreign generated pollution. Therefore, ¯ Er ( ¯ E∗
r) is the
20Hoel and Shapiro (2001) in a multi-regional multi-emissions model of transboundary pollution demon-
strates that with free and costless population mobility amongst them, the eﬃcient policy (eg., regional
contribution to environmental degradation, local pollution taxes, and inter-regional transfers) outcome
is a Nash equilibrium game among the regions. Since, however, multiple Nash equilibria are likely, policy
coordination among the regions may still be necessary in order to achieve the best equilibrium.
14global marginal willingness to pay for pollution abatement of the domestically (foreign)
generated pollution. When ¯ Er − Pg > (< 0) we say that the public pollution abatement
in the home country is globally under-provided (over-provided), and when ¯ Er = Pg ,t h e
public pollution abatement in the home country is globally optimally provided. Similar
deﬁnitions apply for the foreign country.
Equations (24) and (25) indicate that maximizing joint welfare, in the present context,
requires that lump-sum taxes in each country are set at a level where the global marginal
willingness to pay for pollution abatement for pollution generated in each country equals
the unit cost of providing it (i.e., ¯ Er = Pg and ¯ E∗
r∗ = P∗
g∗) . Note that these two equations
represent the relevant Samuelsonian rule for optimal provision of public (pollution abate-
ment) goods. Moreover, because of the existence of cross-border pollution, the relevant
Samuelsonian rule accounts not only for the marginal willingness to pay for pollution
abatement within a country, but also for the marginal willingness to pay for it in the
other country.
4.1.2 Cooperative Pollution Taxes and Welfare





dt∗ =0 ,w h e r edu
dt,a n ddu∗
dt are given by equations (18) and (19), respectively.
Moreover, the reduced form equations for the expressions du∗
dt∗ and du
dt∗ are given by equa-
t i o n s( 2 0 )a n d( 2 1 ) .I ng e n e r a l ,t h ec o o p e r a t i v ep o l l u t i o nt a x e sf o rt h et w oc o u n t r i e sa r e
given by







































where the denominator of equations (26) and (27) is positive, and ˆ Sg = ¯ Er − Pg and
ˆ S∗
g∗ = ¯ E∗
r∗ − P∗
g∗. It is important to note that the cooperative pollution taxes (tc) and
(t∗
c) are independent of (kf). Intuitively, payments to foreign capital operating in the
home country constitute a direct income transfer from the home to the foreign country.
Therefore, the income loss of the home country exactly outweighs the income beneﬁto f
the foreign country, and as such it does not aﬀect the maximization of their joint welfare.
15In the present context of simultaneous cooperative choice of lump-sum (i.e., ˆ Sg =
ˆ S∗
g∗ =0 ) and pollution taxes, equations (26) and (27) reduce to tc = Pg and t∗
c = P∗
g∗.
However, if lump-sum taxes were not chosen cooperatively it is possible that tc ≷ Pg
and/or t∗
c ≷ P∗
g∗. For example, if each country chooses the level of its lump-sum taxes non-
cooperatively in order to maximize its own welfare, then while the level of public pollution
abatement in each country is locally optimally provided from its own perspective, from
the trading block’s point of view, due to the assumed cross-border pollution externality,
there is global under-provision in both countries (ˆ Sg = Θ∗E∗
r∗ > 0, and ˆ S∗
g = ΘEr > 0).
In this case, tc >P g and t∗
c >P ∗
g∗.
Proposition 2 Consider a two-country trading block with perfect capital mobility, and
cross-border pollution between them. Part of pollution abatement is carried out by the
public sector ﬁnanced by means of lump-sum and pollution taxes. The ﬁrst-best policy
choice, maximizing the countries joint welfare, entails their cooperation in choosing both
their respective lump-sum and pollution taxes.
Note that cross-border pollution, not intra-block capital mobility, is the feature of
the model mandating that the two countries choose cooperatively both lump-sum and
pollution taxes in attaining the ﬁrst-best policy choice. In the absence of cross-border
pollution, the cooperative choice of pollution taxes alone suﬃces for attaining the ﬁrst-
best policy choice.
4.2 Optimal Pollution Taxes when Countries are Stackelberg
Followers
Before proceeding on to examining the standard non-cooperative (Nash) regime, we
present a case where each country acts as a Stackelberg follower. In particular, we
assume that the foreign country chooses its tax level, (t∗), ﬁrst and we examine how
the home country reacts optimally in choosing its optimal pollution tax level (t).A
similar exercise is pursued for the foreign country. In doing so we set (du/dt)=0and
(du∗/dt∗)=0in equations (18) and (20) to obtain the optimal pollution taxes (t) and
(t∗) in this case as follows:




























16Equations (28) and (29) represent each country’s policy reaction function. The following
proposition highlights several important features of this regime:
Proposition 3 Under the conditions of the model, and assuming that one country acts
as a Stackelberg leader and the other as a Stackelberg follower, then for the Stackelberg
follower:
1. the optimal pollution tax is equal to the unit price of the public pollution abate-
ment when the latter is locally optimally provided and there is no intra-block capital
mobility.
2. the presence of intra-block capital mobility increases the optimal pollution tax for the
net capital importing country and decreases it for the net capital exporting country
in the absence of transboundary pollution, and
3. the presence of intra-block capital mobility decreases the optimal pollution tax in the
presence of transboundary pollution, when initially kf =0and the other coun-
try’s pollution tax is smaller than the unit price of public pollution abatement.
The ﬁrst result of Proposition 3 states that in the absence of the cross-border pollution
externality (Θ =0 )and of foreign capital operating in the home country (kf =0 ) ,t h e n
t = Pg i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r y ,a n dt∗ = P∗
g∗ in the foreign country. For the second result, the
existence of intra-block capital mobility raises pollution in the home, capital-importing,
country, and reduces it in the foreign, capital-exporting, country. Then, in the absence
of cross-border pollution and since the pollution tax choice of the Stackelberg leader is
given, such capital ﬂows lead to a higher pollution tax in the capital-importing country,
and to a lower pollution tax in the capital-exporting one.
For the third result, that in the presence of transboundary pollution (i.e., Θ > 0 and
Θ∗ > 0) a small intra-block capital mobility (i.e., kf is close to 0) reduces the pollution
tax (t) in the home country when t∗ <P ∗
g∗, the intuition is as follows. The only eﬀect of
capital mobility on welfare, in this case, is through its eﬀect on foreign pollution, z∗−g∗.
An increase in t reduces RK which causes capital to move from the home to the foreign
country. The increase in capital in the foreign country aﬀects both z∗ and g∗.T h e l e v e l
of pollution z∗ rises because the increase in capital increases the production of the capital-
intensive polluting good. The increase in pollution, however, increases the tax receipts
of the foreign government and therefore the provision of public pollution abatement, g∗.
17Since t∗ <P ∗
g∗ the former outweighs the latter and thus the increase in t leads to an
increase in z∗ − g∗, and through transboundadry pollution this increase in r reduces u
leading to a decrease in the optimal pollution tax, t. Similarly, a small intra-block capital
mobility reduces (t∗) in the foreign country, when in the home country t<P g.
4.3 Nash Equilibrium Lump-sum and Pollution Taxes
We know turn to derive the optimal Nash lump-sum and pollution taxes for the home
and foreign countries and compare them to the benchmark cooperative case. The two
countries choose these taxes simultaneously. In this non-cooperative game the only
interactions between the two countries relevant to the analysis are those emanating from
cross-border pollution and intra-block capital mobility.
4.3.1 Nash Lump-sum Taxes
Setting equations (16) and (17) equal to zero, we derive the Nash lump-sum taxes. The
emerging equilibrium conditions require that Nash lump-sum taxes are chosen such that
for the home country Er = Pg and for the foreign country such that E∗
r∗ = P∗
g∗. These
conditions constitute a dominant strategy for each country. That is, each country’s
choice of lump-sum taxes is independent of the other country’s policy choice.
Comparing the Nash optimality conditions to those of the benchmark cooperative
case we derive the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 Under the conditions of the model Nash lump-sum tax levels are lower
than the corresponding cooperative levels.
Proof. Consider the case of the home country. Since Pg is constant and the same




r .21 This implies that EN
r >E C
r . Given that the expenditure function
is assumed strictly convex in (r), we get that rN >r C. A ss h o w nb yt h ec o m p a r a t i v e
statics in the Appendix, an increase in (T) does not aﬀect the level of gross pollution
(z),t h e r e f o r erN >r C implies that gN <g C.A sar e s u l tw eg e tt h a tTN <T C. Similar
reasoning yields T∗N <T ∗C for the foreign country.
21The superscripts (N) and (C) denote the variables evaluated at the Nash and the cooperative
equilibrium, respectively.
18Intuitively, the individual governments in setting their lump-sum taxes, do not account
for the fact that because of cross-border pollution (i.e., a negative externality), the other
country is willing to incur some of the cost of pollution abatement in the ﬁrst country.
Therefore, individual governments by not internalizing this externality set their Nash
lump-sum taxes too low. In contrast, in the cooperative case the two countries accounting
for this externality apply the relevant Samuelsonian rule for the trading-block optimal
provision of the public pollution abatement.
4.3.2 Nash Pollution Taxes
T od e r i v et h eN a s hp o l l u t i o nt a x e sf o rt h et w oc o u n t r i e sw es e tdu
dt =0and du∗
dt∗ =0 . These
reaction functions are given by equations (28) and (29). In contrast to the cooperative
case, payments to foreign capital operating in the home country aﬀect the size of each
country’s Nash pollution tax level.
Given that the structure of the game is such that lump-sum taxes are optimally chosen
(i.e., Sg = S∗
g∗ =0 ), solving simultaneously equations (28) and (29) gives the following
expressions for each country’s Nash pollution taxes.22










































t∗K∗] and is positive.
From equations (30) and (31) we note that when lump-sum taxes are optimally chosen,
then the eﬀect of pollution taxes on payments to foreign capital operating in the home
country constitute the only diﬀerence between the Nash and cooperative cases.
Observing the above expressions we note that in general the Nash pollution taxes can
be greater or smaller than the unit cost of the public pollution abatement, as opposed to
the benchmark case of cooperative choice of both instruments. We resolve some of this
ambiguity by stating the following Proposition, which considers some special cases in the
context of the present model.
Proposition 5 Under the conditions of the model
1. if Θ =0 ,t h e ntN >t c = Pg.
22The general expressions for the Nash pollution taxes when lump-sum taxes are not chosen optimally
are given in the Appendix.




3. if the two countries are symmetric in the sense that Er = E∗
r∗ and RKK = R∗
K∗K∗,
then tN >t c and t∗
N <t ∗
c.
4. if initially kf =0 ,t h e ntN = tc and t∗
N = t∗
c.
The proof of Proposition (5) follows from equations (30) and (31). Intuitively, the ﬁrst
two cases of Proposition (5) are directly derived from the assumption that home is the
capital-importing and foreign is the capital-exporting country, and from the assumption
that pollution is a capital intensive good in both countries. That is, the inﬂow of capital
in the home country raises pollution, thus leading to a higher domestic Nash pollution
tax level. The reverse holds for the foreign capital-exporting country. The intuition of
the third case is as follows. Payments to foreign capital operating in the home country
reduce real income, and thus lower the domestic households marginal willingness to pay
for pollution abatement (i.e., Eru > 0). As a result, at a constant pollution tax (t),n e t
pollution generated at home (i.e., z − g) rises. At the same time, the opposite holds in
the foreign country, i.e., z∗−g∗ falls. If the two countries are symmetric, and since Θ < 1
and Θ∗ < 1, then net pollution (r = z−g+Θ(z∗−g∗)) in the home country rises, and net
pollution (r∗ = z∗ − g∗ + Θ∗(z − g)) in the foreign country falls. Therefore, we get that
i nt h eh o m ec o u n t r ytN >t c, and in the foreign country t∗
N <t ∗
c. Finally, in the last case
where initially kf =0 , there are no payments to foreign capital operating at home, and
thus the cooperative and Nash pollution tax levels are the same. It is important, however,
to note that if the two countries cooperate only in choosing their pollution taxes while
lump-sum taxes are chosen non-cooperatively (Nash taxes), then tc >P g and t∗
c >P ∗
g∗
and if kf =0then tN <t c and t∗
N <t ∗
c.
5 Capital Mobility and the Eﬀect of Pollution Taxes
on net Pollution
In what follows we examine how, ceteris paribus, intra-block capital mobility alters the
eﬀectiveness of pollution taxes in reducing net pollution. The analysis utilizes diﬀer-
ent initial conditions according to whether or not the two countries act cooperatively
in choosing optimally their policy instruments (i.e., lump-sum and/or pollution taxes).
Namely, we examine how capital mobility aﬀects the impact of an increase in pollution
20taxes on net pollution (dr/dt) in each of the three cases in Section 4, that is, when (i) the
two countries choose their policies cooperatively, (ii) one country acts as a Stackelberg
follower and, (iii) both countries choose their policies non-cooperatively (Nash).
Consider the case of no intra-block capital mobility. Then, in all three cases above,
when lump-sum taxes are optimally chosen, cooperatively in the cooperative case (i.e.,
ˆ Sg = ˆ S∗
g∗ =0 ) and non-cooperatively in the other two cases (i.e., Sg = S∗
g∗ =0 ),
the optimal pollution tax equals the unit price of the public pollution abatement in
both countries. This is easily observed from equations (26) and (27) in the case of the
cooperative equilibrium, from equations (28) and (29) in the case where one country
acts as a Stackelberg follower, and ﬁnally from equations (30) and (31) in the case of
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Moreover, equation (13), and its counterpart for the
foreign country (i.e., dr∗/dt∗) indicate that raising the pollution tax, unambiguously
reduces local net pollution.23 Note that the ﬁrst two right-hand-side terms in the reduced
form of equation (13), are due to the intra-block capital mobility.
Assuming the existence of intra-block capital mobility, we ﬁrst consider the case where
the two countries choose cooperatively both their lump-sum and pollution taxes in order
to maximize their joint welfare. In this case, the cooperative pollution taxes equal the
prices of public pollution abatement in each country and thus the eﬀect of pollution
taxes on net pollution is not aﬀected by the presence of capital mobility when evaluated
at the cooperative equilibrium. If, however, the two countries cooperate in their choice
of pollution taxes but choose lump-sum taxes non-cooperatively, so as to each maximize
its own welfare, then the eﬀect of the presence of capital mobility is ambiguous. For zero
or small Θ, the presence of capital mobility reduces the eﬀectiveness of the increase in
pollution taxes on net pollution, dr/dt.24 Similarly, for small Θ∗, the presence of capital
mobility increases dr∗/dt∗.
Next, consider the case where the home country acts as a Stackelberg follower. Com-
bining equation (28) and equation (13), we can conclude that the presence of capital
mobility reduces the eﬀectiveness of the increase in the capital-importing country’s pol-
lution tax on its net pollution, (dr/dt) when Θ is small, or zero. Note, that the overall
eﬀect may even become positive. The opposite is true for the capital-exporting country.
23It is easily shown that when lump-sum taxes are optimally chosen, and in the absence of intra-block
capital mobility, (dr/dt)=−∆−1P∗
g∗Rt < 0, and similarly, (dr/dt)=−∆−1PgR∗
t∗ < 0.
24In other words it increases dr/dt. The more negative dr/dt i st h em o r ee ﬀective t is in reducing net
pollution.
21In all other cases, the eﬀect is ambiguous.
Finally, we examine how the presence of capital mobility aﬀects the impact of an
increase in the home pollution tax on its net pollution evaluated at Nash equilibrium.
The following Proposition summarizes the results:
Proposition 6 Within the assumptions of the model, the presence of capital mobility
decreases (increases) the eﬀectiveness of an increase in the pollution tax on net pollution
evaluated at Nash25 for the capital importing (exporting) country if i) Θ =0( Θ∗ =0 )
and Θ∗ ≥ 0( Θ ≥ 0) and ii) when Θ > 0 and Θ∗ > 0 and both countries are symmetric.
Intuitively, when Θ =0the residents of the home country are only aﬀected by changes
in, z−g. Capital mobility aﬀects both z and g. The increase in t leads to an outﬂow of
capital from the home to the foreig nc o u n t r y ,w h i c hi nt u r nl o w e r sz. On the other hand
the eﬀect on g is negative since the capital outﬂow reduces pollution and thus pollution
tax revenue. At Nash t>P g and thus the eﬀect on g is smaller than that on z,a n d
thus z − g is reduced. In the presence of transboundary pollution (Θ > 0 and Θ∗ > 0)
the same result holds if the two countries are symmetric. The intuition is the same as
that following Proposition (5). It is important to note that if initially kf =0 ,t h e n
the presence of capital mobility does not aﬀect the impact of the pollution tax on net
pollution.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The dawn of the new century has presented the world economy with two eminent chal-
lenges. The ﬁrst is the rapidly growing interdependence amongst national economies
through the process of global or regional economic integration. The second challenge is
the increasingly higher value placed by the international community on the protection
and preservation of the global natural environment. As a result, there is an emerging need
for international cooperation in the design and implementation of economic policies that
minimize the local and global environmental damages of this increasing economic integra-
tion. These two challenges have triggered a relatively modern economic literature on the
so-called “trade vs environment” debate. This literature in formalizing and examining
this debate has identiﬁed cross-border pollution externalities and international capital
25Nash equilibrium refers to the case where the two countries apply their Nash lump-sum taxes and
their Nash pollution taxes simultaneously.
22mobility as key factors aﬀecting domestic trade and environmental policies and thus em-
phasizes the need for international coordination. While most of the literature assumes
that pollution is abated solely by the private sector in response to emission taxes imposed
by governments, a recent strand with less than a handful of theoretical contributions, has
put forth a third relevant feature of this problem. That of the simultaneous undertaking
of pollution abatement by private and public sectors, and of accounting for the means
of ﬁnancing public sector abatement activity. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no
study of this literature has attempted to incorporate all three analytical features, that
is, transboundary pollution, simultaneous provision of private and public sector pollution
abatement, and capital mobility.
The present paper undertakes this task and highlights the interaction among these
three features regarding the design of environmental policies in today’s highly integrated
global economy. To this end, we present a a two-country trading block model with cross
border pollution, free trade in goods and perfect capital mobility within the trading
block. The trade in goods between the trading block and the rest of the world is free,
while the mobility of capital is restricted. Pollution, a by-product of production, adversely
aﬀects welfare and it is abated by the private and public sectors in both countries. The
government uses revenue collected from pollution and lump-sum taxes to ﬁnance public
pollution abatement.
Within this framework, the ﬁrst-best policy is achieved when both countries choose
both tax instruments cooperatively. In this case, the optimal pollution tax in each country
equals the unit cost of public pollution abatement and the optimal lump-sum tax in each
country is the one that equalizes the unit cost of public pollution abatement in that
country with the global damage caused by a unit of pollution generated by that country.
If, however, each country chooses only the pollution taxes cooperatively, while lump-
sum taxes are chosen non-cooperatively (i.e., to maximize its own welfare), then from
the trading block’s perspective, due to cross-border pollution, there is under-provision of
public pollution abatement, and the cooperative pollution tax is greater than the unit
cost of public pollution abatement.
When each country acts non-cooperatively, in order to maximize its own welfare,
then i) the non-cooperative lump-sum taxes are lower than the cooperative ones, ii)
the cooperative and non-cooperative pollution taxes are equal only in the case where
initially the net capital stock of one country into the other is zero, iii) if countries are
23symmetric in the sense described by proposition 5, the Nash pollution tax is greater
than its cooperative level for the capital importing country (the opposite is true for the
capital-exporting country), and iv) in general, if no foreign pollution is transmitted in
the capital importing country, then its Nash pollution tax is higher than the cooperative
one and similarly if no foreign pollution is transmitted into the capital exporting country,
then its Nash pollution tax is lower than the cooperative one.
The presence of intra-block capital mobility does not alter the eﬀectiveness of pol-
lution taxes in reducing net pollution when each country chooses both tax instruments
cooperatively. If, however, each country chooses its pollution tax cooperatively and the
lump-sum tax non-cooperatively, then the presence of capital mobility reduces the ef-
fectiveness of the pollution tax on net pollution for each country. When both countries
behave non-cooperatively, then the presence of capital mobility lowers (raises) the eﬀec-
tiveness of an increase in the pollution tax on net pollution for the capital-importing
(exporting) country, if there is no ﬂow of foreign pollution in that country or when there
is cross border pollution but the countries are symmetric.
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